Soc Vulnerability #2

The domain of Attacks

Software
Hardware

Attack Model

CAPEC-233: Privilege Escalation

CWE-ID: – 266

Hardware-based isolation and access control (e.g., identity, policy, locking control) of sensitive shared hardware resources such as registers and fuses, and information leakage.

Threat Model – Privilege Escalation

Soc Vul. #	Name of Core	Security Requirement	Threat model description	Effect	SW attack model
2	CVA6 RISC-V CPU	Privilege level should be in Machine mode	Privilege Escalation: Tweaked to User mode/Supervisor mode	Changing the mode can have side-effects on address translation (e.g.: other instructions) Re-fetch the next instruction by executing a flush	A software code will access M mode and S mode registers.  Possible attacks: Access control, Illegal interrupt, information leakage etc

Table 1. Attack model description

Description

In a system-on-chip (SoC), software will commonly access the peripherals through a memory-mapped register interface. Thus, software can access only certain registers with respect to their privilege level hardcoded in the design. However, through the accessible register interface, malicious software could tamper the hardware data. This threat could allow any adversary to exploit a weakness enabling them to elevate their privilege and perform an action that they are not supposed to be authorized to perform.

Security Property

property one1;
                @(posedge clk_i) (debug_req_i == 1’b0)|-> (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o == riscv::PRIV_LVL_S) or (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o == riscv::PRIV_LVL_U) or (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o == riscv::PRIV_LVL_M);
        endproperty
        ap_vulnerability11: assert property (one1);
property one2;
                @(posedge clk_i) (debug_req_i == 1’b1)|-> (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o == riscv::PRIV_LVL_M); //machine mode is low-priviledged
      endproperty
        ap_vulnerability12: assert property (one2);
              property one3;
                @(posedge clk_i) (debug_req_i == 1’b1)|-> (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o != riscv::PRIV_LVL_U);
        endproperty
        ap_vulnerability13: assert property (one3);
property one4;
                @(posedge clk_i) (debug_req_i == 1’b1)|-> (ariane.csr_regfile_i.priv_lvl_o != riscv::PRIV_LVL_S) ;
        endproperty
        ap_vulnerability14: assert property (one4);
endmodule

Table 2. Assertions/properties to check privilege escalation in RISC-V design.

Procedure

Invoke Cadence JG
Run prove_tl.tcl script to check the assertion
Violation in the assertion will generate CEX

DOWNLOAD FILES

Impact of Vulnerability

Loss of confidentiality and integrity of the SoC

Severity

TBA (Metrics to evaluate the vulnerability impact)

tools used

Cadence JasperGold

Results (counter-example)

Fig 1.0

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Fig 1.1

Counter-example insights

Fig.2 shows that the privilege escalation from M-mode to U-mode exists in the RISC-V design at the clock pulse of 264.

SoC Vulnerability #2